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Abstract. We solve an infinite time-horizon bounded-variation stochastic control problem with regime
switching between N states. This is motivated by the problem of a government that wants to control the
country’s debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio. In our formulation, the debt-to-GDP ratio evolves
stochastically in continuous time, and its drift – given by the interest rate on government debt, net of the
growth rate of GDP – is affected by an exogenous macroeconomic risk process modelled by a continuous-
time Markov chain with N states. The government can act on the public debt by increasing or decreasing
its level, and it aims at minimising a net expected regime-dependent cost functional. Without relying on a
guess-and-verify approach, but performing a direct probabilistic study, we show that it is optimal to keep
the debt-to-GDP ratio in an interval, whose boundaries depend on the states of the risk process. These
boundaries are given through a zero-sum optimal stopping game with regime switching with N states and
are characterised through a system of nonlinear algebraic equations with constraints. To the best of our
knowledge, such a result appears here for the first time. Finally, we put in practice our methodology in a
case study of a Markov chain with N = 2 states; we provide a thorough analysis and we complement our
theoretical results by a detailed numerical study on the sensitivity of the optimal debt ratio management
policy with respect to the problem’s parameters.
Keywords: singular stochastic control, zero-sum optimal stopping game, free-boundary problem,
regime switching, debt-to-GDP ratio.
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1. Introduction
It has been observed that during the financial crisis that started in 2007, debt-to-GDP ratio (also called
the “debt ratio”) exploded from an average of 53% to circa 80% in many countries. Ever since, there has
been a huge debate in the economic and political community on the sustainability of public debt. Using
different statistical and methodological approaches, many researchers conclude that high government debt
has negative economic and financial effects, as it makes the economy less resilient to macroeconomic shocks
(e.g. sovereign default risks and liquidity shocks), and poses limits to the adoption of counter-cyclical fiscal
policies (see [26], among many others). The common view derived from the empirical evidence is that,
from the perspective of a government’s general economic planning, it is important to reduce high levels
of debt ratio in order to maintain fiscal sustainability and support stronger fundamentals. However, in
[23] researchers from the International Monetary Fund also suggest that reducing the debt ratio might
not be always the most sensible approach. The conclusion seems to apply in particular to those countries
enjoying sufficient “fiscal space”1, like U.S.A., Germany and the U.K.. When deciding their economic
planning, governments are presented with two questions: How much is too much? and How low is too
low?. In this paper, we propose a mathematical formulation of the optimal debt ratio’s management
problem faced by a government that addresses both of these questions.
In our model, the GDP of the country is a geometric Brownian motion with growth rate g and volatility
(per unit of GDP) σ. The real debt evolves exponentially with rate r+λYt , which is the interest rate on debt
that the government pays at time t. This consists of a fixed deterministic component r and a stochastic,
time-varying component λYt . As a matter of fact, this is a generalisation of the standard exponential
Date: December 9, 2019.
1This is the distance between the government’s debt ratio and an “upper limit”, calculated by the Moody’s ratings agency,
beyond which the government should reduce debt in order to avoid default.
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evolution of real debt with constant rate that one can find in classical textbooks of macroeconomics (see
[2], among others). The stochastic, time-varying component of the interest rate is driven by a continuous-
time Markov chain Y with N states, modelling market factors that are not under the control of the
government. In this sense, λYt is the additional interest that the government pays on debt at time t, e.g.
due to a change of the credit rating of the country, or to a mass sell-off of government bonds. As a result,
in absence of any intervention, the debt-to-GDP ratio evolves stochastically following geometric dynamics
with regime switching in the drift r + λYt − g.
When in debt, the government incurs an instantaneous cost which may be interpreted as an opportunity
cost resulting, e.g., from private investments crowding out, less room for financing public investments,
and from a tendency to suffer low subsequent growth (see [26], among others, for empirical studies). We
allow this cost to depend on the current economic regime Y . The government may intervene in order to
decrease or increase the level of the debt ratio, and we assume that these policies have an instantaneous
effect. Consequently, the cumulative amount of debt ratio’s increase and decrease are the government’s
control variables. Any decrease of the debt ratio by the government results in proportional costs, whereas
any increase results in proportional benefits. We further assume that the government discounts costs and
benefits at a stochastic time-varying rate modulated by the changes in the economic regime. The objective
of the government is to minimise the total expected discounted costs incurred by debt and the cost of
decreasing the debt ratio, net of the benefits arising from an increase of the latter by the government.
The mathematical formulation associated with the above problem is that of a bounded-variation sto-
chastic control problem, in which the state process is a linearly controlled geometric Brownian motion
with regime switching and the cost functional is regime dependent as well. This is due to the N -state
Markov chain Y modelling the macroeconomic conditions. We succeed in determining the explicit solution
to this problem. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper which completely solves a singular
stochastic control problem with: (i) regime switching between an arbitrary number N ≥ 2 of states and
(ii) controls of bounded-variation.
We solve this problem without relying on a classical guess-and-verify approach. Indeed, if we attempt
to follow such an approach, we should solve a system of N coupled ordinary differential equations with
gradient constraints (the coupling is through the transition rates of the Markov chain Y ), and then
verify that the obtained solution satisfies the dynamic programming equation which takes the form of
a variational inequality. Given the complexity of the problem under consideration, this approach seems
not to be feasible. In fact, even in the particular example with N = 2 regimes addressed in Section 6.2,
the guess-and-verify approach would require proving existence and uniqueness of a quadruple solving a
highly nonlinear system of four algebraic equations with constraints (see (6.17)–(6.20) with (6.21)–(6.22)
below). Obviously, the complexity increases with N (see Remark 6.2).
Instead, here we tackle the problem via a direct probabilistic approach, by relating the bounded-variation
stochastic control problem to a zero-sum game of optimal stopping (Dynkin game) with regime switching.
Such a connection to a Dynkin game has two main advantages. Firstly, it provides the geometry of the
state space in terms of regions where it is optimal to intervene and wait. Secondly, it allows to achieve
the regularity of the control problem’s value function V needed for the characterisation of the optimal
control policy. Our analysis begins by first proving an abstract existence and uniqueness result for the
optimal debt-management policy, upon relying on a suitable application of Komlo´s’ theorem (see also [11]
and [20]). Using this result, we apply Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 of [20], and provide the form of a Dynkin
game with regime switching, whose value v coincides with the first derivative of V . We then study the
Dynkin game by employing mostly probabilistic arguments, and we prove the structure of its saddle
point. This consists of a couple of entry times to two connected regions (the so-called “stopping regions”)
whose boundaries a and b depend on the current regime of the Markov chain Y . For any such regime i,
we then prove that v is everywhere continuously differentiable, thus implying the well-known smooth-fit
condition of v at the boundaries of the stopping regions. Such a regularity of v, in turn, immediately
gives that V is C2 for any regime i. Hence, through this direct approach, we manage to prove that
V is a classical solution to the corresponding dynamic programming equation, which we use to provide
the structure of an optimal control rule. At any time, this prescribes to keep the (optimally) controlled
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debt ratio process inside the interval [a(Yt), b(Yt)], either in a minimal way (i.e. according to a Skorokhod
reflection) if it is already inside, or with an immediate jump, if it suddenly goes outside (i.e. according to a
lump-sum increase/decrease). Thus, these two levels defining the interval, trigger the timing at which the
government should optimally intervene to either increase or decrease the debt ratio. It is worth noticing
that the aforementioned methodology can also be applied to solve other singular or bounded-variation
stochastic control problems under regime switching with such an arbitrary number N ≥ 2 of states. These
could be natural directions for future research.
In order to prove the existence of an optimal control policy we need to impose a condition on the
marginal cost and benefit of increasing and decreasing the debt ratio, respectively. Interestingly, in
Section 6.1, we show that this condition also plays a fundamental role in establishing an ordering of the
optimal stopping boundaries a(i) and b(i) across the N different regimes i. In particular, this result can
be exploited to determine the explicit equations that the optimal boundaries a and b necessarily satisfy.
These equations follow from the C1-property of v previously proved. We put in practice our methodology
in Section 6.2 in a case study of N = 2 regimes. To the best of our knowledge, even the study of the
case with N = 2 regimes appears in this paper for the first time. Finally, we complement our theoretical
results by a detailed numerical study on the sensitivity of the optimal debt ratio management policy with
respect to the problem’s parameters.
Our paper is placed among those few works employing continuous-time singular stochastic control
methods for public debt management. In [5] and [6], the debt ratio evolves as a linearly controlled one-
dimensional geometric Brownian motion and the government can only reduce its level through singular
controls and bounded-velocity controls, respectively. The objective is to minimise the total expected costs
arising from having debt and intervening on it. Instead, in our model, the government can both reduce and
increase the debt ratio, and the dynamics of the latter is affected by two sources of uncertainty: a Brownian
motion and a continuous-time Markov chain. In [9], the problem is again to only optimally reduce the
debt ratio, but in that case the government takes into consideration the evolution of the inflation rate of
the country. The latter evolves as an uncontrolled diffusion process which makes the problem a fully two-
dimensional singular stochastic control problem. This clearly leads to a completely different mathematical
treatment than this paper. In [7], a partially informed government on the underlying business conditions,
once again only reduces the debt ratio. By adopting filtering techniques, the government’s optimal control
problem is reduced to one under full information, and then solved in a case study.
Also the literature on singular stochastic control problems with regime switching is still limited, and
most of the papers deal only with Markov chains with N = 2 states and with monotone controls. We
refer, e.g., to [18] and [29] where the optimal dividend problem of actuarial science is formulated as a
one-dimensional monotone follower problem; to [16] for an irreversible investment problem; to the recent
[10] for an optimal extraction problem. In this paper, we provide the complete solution to a singular
stochastic control problem under regime switching with N ≥ 2 states, where the control processes are not
monotone but have paths of bounded variation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and provide the control
problem formulation of the government. In Section 3, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the
optimal debt ratio management policy, and we introduce the associated Dynkin game. In Section 4, we
study the Dynkin game and we characterise its saddle point. These results are then used in Section 5 to
construct the optimal debt ratio management policy. The geometry of the problem’s state space is studied
in Section 6.1, while a case study with N = 2 regimes is then considered in Section 6.2. We also provide
a detailed comparative statics analysis (see Section 6.2.2) and comparison with the non-regime-switching
case (see Section 6.3).
2. Setting and Problem Formulation
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space rich enough to accommodate a one-dimensional Brownian
motion W := (Wt)t≥0 and a continuous-time Markov chain Y := (Yt)t≥0. To be more precise, Y is such
that for all t ≥ 0, Yt ∈ M := {1, 2, . . . , N} for some N ≥ 2, and it has an irreducible generator matrix
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Q := (qij)1≤i,j≤N with
P(Yt+∆t = j |Yt = i, Ys, s ≤ t) :=

qij∆t+ o(∆t) if j 6= i
1 + qii∆t+ o(∆t) if j = i.
Here qij ≥ 0 for (i, j) ∈ M ×M with j 6= i, and qii = −
∑
j 6=i qij < 0 for each i ∈ M. The Markov
chain Y jumps between the states at exponentially distributed random times, and the constant qij gives
the rate of jumping from state i to j. We take Y independent of W , and denote by F := {Ft, t ≥ 0} the
filtration jointly generated by W and Y , and as usual, augmented by P-null sets.
We assume that in absence of any intervention by the government, the debt-to-GDP ratio evolves
according to the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
(2.1) dX0t =
(
r + λYt − g
)
X0t dt+ σX
0
t dWt, t > 0, X
0
0 = x > 0.
These dynamics might be seen as a stochastic version of the one proposed in classical macroeconomic
textbooks, see e.g. [2]. Here g ∈ R is the growth rate of the GDP, whereas r + λYt is the interest rate
on government debt. This interest rate consists of a basis fixed component r > 0, and of a time-varying
stochastic component λYt which represents the additional interest rate that the country has to pay at
time t when the macroeconomic conditions are in state Yt ∈M.
Assumption 2.1. Without loss of generality, we assume that λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λN , hence λYt ∈ [λN , λ1],
P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0.
In the following we will often denote by Xx,i,0 the unique strong solution to (2.1) starting at time zero
from level x > 0 when Y0 = i ∈M; that is,
(2.2) Xx,i,0t = xe
(r−g− 1
2
σ2)t+
∫ t
0 λY is
ds+σWt , t ≥ 0.
We also denote by Y it the Markov chain Yt started from state i ∈M at initial time.
Remark 2.2. Dynamics (2.1) can be justified in the following way. In absence of any intervention by the
government, the nominal debt Dt grows at time t ≥ 0 at rate r+λYt; i.e., dDt = (r+λYt)Dtdt. Assuming
that the GDP, ψ, evolves stochastically as
dψt = gψtdt+ σψtdBt,
for some Brownian motion B, an application of Itoˆ’s formula and a change of measure shows that X0 :=
D/ψ follows the geometric dynamics (2.1).
The government can increase or decrease the current level of the debt-to-GDP ratio by, e.g., making
investments on infrastructures or imposing austerity policies in the form of spending cuts, respectively.
Denoting by ηt the cumulative amount, e.g., of spending cuts made up to time t ≥ 0 in order to reduce
the debt-to-GDP ratio, and by ξt the cumulative amount, e.g, of investments made up to time t ≥ 0, the
dynamics of the adjusted debt-to-GDP ratio read as
(2.3) dXt =
(
r + λYt − g
)
Xtdt+ σXtdWt + dξt − dηt, t > 0, X0 = x ∈ R+.
Given that ξ and η represent the cumulative interventions, it is natural to model them as nondecreasing
stochastic processes, adapted with respect to the available flow of information F. Hence we take ξ and η
in the set
U :={ϑ : Ω× R+ → R+, F-adapted and such that t 7→ ϑt is a.s. nondecreasing and left-continuous}.
In the following, we set ϑ0 = 0 a.s. for any ϑ ∈ U . We suppose that the government cannot make at
the same instant in time interventions to increase and decrease the debt ratio; i.e., we assume that the
(random) measures dξ· and dη· on R+ induced by the nondecreasing processes ξ and η, respectively, have
disjoint supports. We then denote by ϕ the process belonging to
V :={ζ : Ω× R+ → R, F-adapted and such that t 7→ ζt is a.s.
(locally) of bounded variation, left-continuous and ζ0 = 0},
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whose unique minimal decomposition is given by the two nondecreasing processes ξ and η; that is, ϕt =
ξt − ηt, for all t ≥ 0.
For any ϕ = ξ − η ∈ V, equation (2.3) admits the unique strong solution
(2.4) Xx,i,ϕt = X
1,i,0
t
[
x+
∫
[0,t)
dξs
X1,i,0s
−
∫
[0,t)
dηs
X1,i,0s
]
, t ≥ 0,
where we have stressed the dependency on ϕ ∈ V and on the initial datum (x, i) ∈ R+ ×M by writing
Xx,i,ϕ. Here, Xx,i,0 is as in (2.2), and it is the unique strong solution to (2.3) when ξ = η ≡ 0 and
therefore ϕ ≡ 0.
Having a debt ratio level Xt under the state Yt at time t ≥ 0, the government incurs an instantaneous
cost h(Xt, Yt). This may be interpreted as an opportunity cost that depends on the current macroeconomic
conditions and results from private investments’ crowding out, less room for financing public investments,
and from a tendency to suffer low subsequent growth.
In the rest of the paper, we set gx(x, i) :=
∂g
∂x(x, i) for any differentiable function g : R×M→ R, and
we make the following standing assumption on the running cost function h : R×M 7→ R+.
Assumption 2.3. For any i ∈M, we have
(i) x 7→ h(x, i) is strictly convex, continuously differentiable and increasing on [0,∞), and it is such
that h(x, i) = 0 for any x ≤ 0;
(ii) the derivative hx of h satisfies hx(0, i) = 0 and limx→∞ hx(x, i) = +∞;
(iii) there exists m > 1, K1 > 0, K2 > 0 and K3 > 0 such that
h(x, i) ≤ K1(1 + |x|m) and |hx(x, i)| ≤ K2(1 + |x|m−1), x ∈ R,
and
|hx(x, i)− hx(y, i)| ≤ K3|x− y|(1 + |x|(m−2)+), (x, y) ∈ R2;
(iv) h(·, i) has finite Legendre transform on (0,∞); that is, for all p > 0 we have supx∈R+
(
px −
h(x, i)
)
<∞.
Remark 2.4. It is worth noticing that a cost function of the form h(x, i) = κ(i)2 x
2 for any (x, i) ∈ R+×M
and h(x, i) = 0 for any (x, i) ∈ R− ×M satisfies Assumption 2.3. Moreover, the assumption h(0, i) = 0
is without loss of generality, since if h(0, i) = ho(i) > 0 then one can always set h˜(x, i) := h(x, i)− ho(i)
and write h(x, i) = h˜(x, i) + ho(i), so that the optimisation problem (cf. (2.7) below) remains unchanged
up to an additive constant. Notice that such a requirement, together with hx(0, i) = 0, implies that any
infinitesimal amount of debt does not generate holding costs for the country; indeed, h(ε, i) ≈ hx(0, i)ε = 0.
Whenever the government decides to reduce the level of debt ratio, it incurs an intervention cost that is
proportional to the amount of debt reduction (see also [5] and [9]). This might be seen as a measure of the
social and financial consequences deriving from a debt-reduction policy, and the associated marginal cost
c1 > 0 allows to express it in monetary terms. On the other hand, the government can increase the current
level of debt ratio (e.g. through investments in infrastructure, healthcare, education and research, etc.),
and we assume that this has a positive social and financial effect, thus overall reduces the total expected
“costs” of the government. The marginal benefit of increasing the debt ratio is a constant c2 > 0.
We further assume that the government discounts at a strictly positive time-varying stochastic rate
ρYt ∈ [ρ, ρ], when the macroeconomic conditions are in state Yt ∈ M at time t ≥ 0. Then, the total
expected cost functional, net of investment benefits, is
(2.5) Jx,i(ϕ) := E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsh(Xϕt , Yt)dt+ c1
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdηt − c2
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdξt
]
,
where, for any (x, i) ∈ O := R+ ×M, E(x,i) denotes the expectation under the measure P(x,i)( · ) :=
P( · |Xϕ0 = x, Y0 = i). In the following we will equivalently write E[f(Xx,i,ϕt , Y it )] = E(x,i)[f(Xϕt , Yt)], for
any t ≥ 0 and Borel-measurable function f : R ×M → R such that the previous expectation is finite.
Hereafter, we use the notation
∫ t
0 ( · )dϑs =
∫
[0,t)( · )dϑs, for ϑ ∈ {ξ, η} and any t ∈ [0,∞].
6 FERRARI, RODOSTHENOUS
For any given initial value of the debt ratio x ≥ 0 and of the state of the economy i ∈ M, we
assume that the government will not use a debt ratio management policy leading to infinite cost/benefit
of interventions, and given that the debt ratio level is always a positive number, the government picks its
debt ratio management policy ϕ in the set
A(x, i) :=
{
ϕ ∈ V : E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds
(
dηt + dξt
)]
<∞ and Xx,i,ϕt ≥ 0 P⊗ dt− a.e.
}
.(2.6)
The government’s aim is therefore to solve
(2.7) V (x, i) := inf
ϕ∈A(x,i)
Jx,i(ϕ), (x, i) ∈ O.
We will refer to V as the value function, and any debt ratio management policy belonging to A will be
called admissible.
The following assumption on the model’s parameters will hold true in the rest of this paper.
Assumption 2.5. The model’s parameters satisfy
c1(ρ− r + g − λ1) > c2(ρ− r + g − λN )
Since λN ≤ λ1 and ρ < ρ, Assumption 2.5 in particular implies the condition c1 > c2. This is typically as-
sumed in the literature on bounded-variation stochastic control problems in order to ensure well-posedness
of the optimisation problem (see, e.g., [11] and [17]) and to avoid arbitrage opportunities. Assumption
2.5 will play a central role in the proof of existence of an optimal debt ratio management policy for
problem (2.7) (see the proof of Lemma 3.3 below). It is also worth noticing that Assumption 2.5 will have
important implications on the geometry of the state space (see Proposition 6.1 below).
3. On the Existence of the Optimal Debt Ratio Management Policy
In this section we prove some preliminary properties of the value function, the existence and uniqueness
of an optimal debt ratio management policy for problem (2.7), and its relation to a zero-sum game of
optimal stopping (Dynkin game).
We start with the following result, whose proof is standard and therefore omitted.
Proposition 3.1. The value function V of (2.7) is such that x 7→ V (x, i) is convex on R+ for any i ∈M.
Moreover, V (x, i) ≤ c1x for all (x, i) ∈ O.
To take care of the infinite time-horizon of our problem we need the following assumption, which will
also hold throughout the rest of this paper.
Assumption 3.2. Recall m from Assumption 2.3. The model’s parameters satisfy
ρ >
(
(r − g + λ1) ∨
(
m(r − g + λ1) + σ
2
2
m(m− 1)))+.
Assumption 3.2 may be justified by noting that the government, which runs only for a limited amount
of years, is more concerned about the present than the future, and therefore discounts future costs and
benefits at a sufficiently large rate. Moreover, a combination of the condition ρ > (m(r − g + λ1) +
σ2
2 m(m − 1))+ with Assumption 2.3-(iii), ensures that the trivial admissible policy “do not intervene at
all on the debt ratio” yields a finite expected cost, even if it is not necessarily the minimal one.
Notice that setting
(3.1) ξt :=
∫ t
0
dξs
X1,i,0s
and ηt :=
∫ t
0
dηs
X1,i,0s
, ξ0 = 0 = η0,
and ϕ := ξ − η, the solution to (2.4) rewrites as
(3.2) Xx,i,ϕt = X
1,i,0
t
[
x+ ξt − ηt
]
, t ≥ 0.
The quantities dξt and dηt are the sizes of interventions made at time t ≥ 0, per unit of debt ratio in
absence of any intervention.
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Then, by defining A, for any (x, i) ∈ O, as
A(x, i) :=
{
ϕ ∈ V : E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsX1,i,0t (dηt + dξt)] <∞ and x+ ξt − ηt ≥ 0 P⊗ dt− a.e.},
it is easy to see that the mapping A(x, i) 3 ϕ 7→ ϕ ∈ A(x, i) is one-to-one and onto, and one can also
write for any (x, i) ∈ O
V (x, i) = inf
ϕ∈A(x,i)
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsh(X1,i,0t [x+ ξt − ηt], Y it )dt
+ c1
∫ ∞
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsX1,i,0t dηt − c2
∫ ∞
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsX1,i,0t dξt
]
.(3.3)
The definitions of ξ and η in (3.1) will be used in the proof of the next result.
Lemma 3.3. Let (x, i) ∈ O be arbitrary but fixed, and let (ϕn)n∈N := (ξn, ηn)n∈N be a minimising sequence
for problem (2.7) (equivalently, (3.3)). Then
(3.4) sup
n∈N
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdηnt +
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdξnt
]
<∞.
Proof. Let (x, i) ∈ O be given and fixed, and let (ϕn)n∈N := (ξn, ηn)n∈N be a minimising sequence for
problem (2.7) (equivalently, (3.3)). Without loss of generality, we can take (ϕn)n∈N such that
1 + V (x, i) ≥ Jx,i(ϕn), for any n,
and then recalling that V (x, i) ≤ c1x due to Proposition 3.1, it follows from (2.5) and (3.2) that
1 + c1x ≥ 1 + V (x, i) ≥ Jx,i(ϕn) =E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsh(X1,i,0t [x+ ξnt − ηnt ], Y it )dt]
+ E(x,i)
[
c1
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdηnt − c2
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdξnt
]
.(3.5)
By Assumption 2.3-(iv), for any ε > 0 there exists κε > 0 such that h(x, i) ≥ εx − κε for any (x, i) ∈
R+ ×M. Taking this into account together with the monotonicity of h(·, i) in Assumption 2.3-(i), (2.2)
and the positivity of xX1,i,0, we can therefore continue from (3.5) by writing
1 + c1x ≥− κε
ρ
+ εE
[ ∫ ∞
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsX1,i,0t (ξnt − ηnt )dt]
+ E(x,i)
[
c1
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdηnt − c2
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdξnt
]
.(3.6)
Notice now that due to (3.1) we have for either (ϑn, ϑ
n
) = (ξn, ξ
n
) or (ϑn, ϑ
n
) = (ηn, ηn) that
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsX1,i,0t ϑnt dt
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsX1,i,0t
(∫ t
0
dϑnu
X1,i,0u
)
dt
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
1
X1,i,0u
E
[ ∫ ∞
u
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsX1,i,0t dt
∣∣∣Fu] dϑnu],(3.7)
where Tonelli’s theorem and Theorem 57 in Chapter VI of [12] imply the last equality.
We now want to find a lower bound for E[
∫∞
u e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsX1,i,0t dt|Fu]/X1,i,0u . To accomplish that we
notice that (2.2), the fact that λYt ≥ λN and ρYt ≤ ρ, P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0, and a change of variable of
integration give
1
X1,i,0u
E
[ ∫ ∞
u
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsX1,i,0t dt
∣∣∣Fu] ≥ e− ∫ u0 ρY is ds E[ ∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−r+g−λN+
1
2
σ2)teσ(Wt+u−Wu) dt
∣∣∣Fu]
= e
− ∫ u0 ρY is ds ∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−r+g−λN )tdt = e−
∫ u
0 ρY is
ds
β2,(3.8)
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where we have set β2 := (ρ − r + g − λN )−1 < ∞ by Assumption 3.2. In (3.8) the independence of
Brownian increments, the stationarity of their distribution, and the formula for the Laplace transform of
a Gaussian random variable have been employed in the penultimate step. Analogously, but using now
that λYt ≤ λ1 and ρYt ≥ ρ, P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0, we find
1
X1,i,0u
E
[ ∫ ∞
u
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsX1,i,0t dt
∣∣∣Fu] ≤ e− ∫ u0 ρY is ds ∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−r+g−λ1)tdt = e−
∫ u
0 ρY is
ds
β1,(3.9)
with β1 := (ρ− r + g − λ1)−1 <∞ by Assumption 3.2.
Recalling (3.7) and using (3.8) and (3.9) we then find from (3.6) that
1 + c1x+
κε
ρ
≥ (εβ2 − c2)E(x,i)[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdξnt
]
+
(
c1 − εβ1
)
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdηnt
]
.(3.10)
The previous estimate holds for any ε > 0. Hence setting Θε(x) := 1 + c1x +
κε
ρ , we can take ε = c2/β2
in (3.10) and obtain
β2 Θc2/β2(x) ≥
(
c1β2 − c2β1)E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdηnt
]
.
On the other hand, by taking ε = c1/β1 in (3.10) we have
β1Θc1/β1(x) ≥
(
c1β2 − c2β1)E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdξnt
]
.
Noticing that c1β2 − c2β1 > 0 by Assumption 2.5, the last two inequalities then give
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds
(
dξnt + dη
n
t
)] ≤ β2Θc2/β2(x) + β1Θc1/β1(x)
c1β2 − c2β1 ,
which clearly implies (3.4) since the right-hand side of the latter is independent of n. 
In view of Lemma 3.3, we can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.4. Let (x, i) ∈ O be given and fixed. There exists a unique (up to undistinguishability)
optimal debt ratio management policy ϕ? = ξ? − η? for the problem (2.7).
Proof. Uniqueness (up to undistinguishability) of the optimal debt management policy is due, as usual,
to the strict convexity of the cost functional and to the affine structure of the controlled state variable
with respect to the control. Therefore, in the following we only prove existence of an optimal control.
Let (x, i) ∈ O be given and fixed, and let (ϕn)n∈N := (ξn, ηn)n∈N be a minimising sequence for problem
(2.7). By (3.4) in Lemma 3.3 we deduce that
sup
n∈N
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds
(
ηnt + ξ
n
t
)
dt
]
<∞;
that is, (ϕn)n∈N is bounded in L1(Ω × R+, µ), where µ := P(dω) ⊗ e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdt. Komlo´s’ theorem [21]
thus implies that there exists a subsequence (still denoted by (ϕn)n∈N for simplicity of notation) and a
pair of measurable processes ξ? and η? such that the Cesa`ro sequences
ξ˜n :=
1
n
n∑
j=1
ξj → ξ? and η˜n := 1
n
n∑
j=1
ηj → η?, µ− a.e.
Hence, setting ϕ˜n := ξ˜n− η˜n and ϕ? := ξ?−η?, we get ϕ˜n → ϕ?, µ-a.e. Arguing as in Lemmata 4.5-4.7 of
[19] (notice indeed that our a.e. convergence implies the weak convergence employed in that paper) one
can show that ξ? and η? admit modifications – that we still denote by ξ? and η? – that are nondecreasing,
left-continuous and F-adapted; that is, ϕ? ∈ V, and Xx,i,ϕ?t ≥ 0, P⊗ dt-a.e.
Moreover, it follows from Portmanteau theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 2.1 in [1]) that P-a.s.
lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
fu dξ˜
n
u =
∫ ∞
0
fu dξ
?
u and lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
fu dη˜
n
u =
∫ ∞
0
fu dη
?
u,
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for any bounded function f : R+ → R+ that is continuous dξ?-a.e. (resp., dη?-a.e.) on R+. The latter
convergence in particular yields
(3.11) lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ u
0 ρYsdsdξ˜nu =
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ u
0 ρYsdsdξ?u and lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ u
0 ρYsdsdη˜nu =
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ u
0 ρYsdsdη?u,
which by Fatou’s lemma and (3.4) gives E(x,i)[
∫∞
0 e
− ∫ t0 ρYsdsdη?t + ∫∞0 e− ∫ t0 ρYsdsdξ?t ] < ∞, and therefore
ϕ? ∈ A. Furthermore, we have P-a.s. for a.e. t ≥ 0 that
(3.12) lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
1[0,t)(s)
dξ˜ns
X1,i,0s
=
∫ ∞
0
1[0,t)(s)
dξ?s
X1,i,0s
= ξ?t
(3.13) lim
n↑∞
∫ ∞
0
1[0,t)(s)
dη˜ns
X1,i,0s
=
∫ ∞
0
1[0,t)(s)
dη?s
X1,i,0s
= η?t
upon recalling (3.1) to have the last two equalities in (3.12) and (3.13).
If we can now apply Fatou’s lemma to Jx,i(ϕ˜n) from (2.5) in view of the limits (3.11)–(3.13) and the
expressions (2.4) and (3.2) of Xx,i,ϕ, we obtain that
(3.14) Jx,i(ϕ?) ≤ lim inf
n↑∞
Jx,i(ϕ˜n) ≤ V (x, i),
where we have used that (ϕ˜n)nN is also a minimising sequence due to the convexity of Jx,i( · ) on V. Hence,
ϕ? is optimal.
Therefore, in order to complete the proof of this part, we show in the remaining that Fatou’s lemma
can be indeed applied. Using the change of measure from (4.2) on the expression of Jx,i(·) involved in
(3.3), we can write (see (4.1) as well)
Jx,i(ϕn) = Ê
[ ∫ ∞
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is ds 1
Mt
h
(
X1,i,0t
[
x+ ξ
n
t − ηnt
]
, Y it
)
dt
]
+ Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t
(
c1dη
n
t − c2dξnt
)]
= Ê
[ ∫ ∞
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is ds 1
Mt
h
(
X1,i,0t
[
x+ ξ
n
t − ηnt
]
, Y it
)
dt
]
+ Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t
(
ρYt − λYt − r + g)
)(
c1η
n
t − c2ξnt
)
dt
]
,
where an integration by parts for the integrals with respect to dηnt and dξ
n
t and (3.4) have been used to
obtain the last equality. Thus, by defining the random variable
Φn :=
∫ ∞
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is ds 1
Mt
h
(
X1,i,0t
[
x+ ξ
n
t − ηnt
]
, Y it
)
dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t
(
ρY it − λY it − r + g)
)(
c1η
n
t − c2ξnt
)
dt
we will prove that Fatou’s lemma can be applied in (3.14), if we find an integrable random variable Λ,
independent of n, such that Φn ≥ Λ, P̂-a.s. To this end, using that λN ≤ λY it ≤ λ1 and ρ ≤ ρY it ≤ ρ,
P̂-a.s., and that for any ε > 0 there exists κε > 0 such that h(x, i) ≥ εx− κε for any (x, i) ∈ R+ ×M (cf.
Assumption 2.3-(iv)) together with (4.3), we can write P̂-a.s. that
Φn ≥− κε
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
Mt
dt+
εx
ρ− r + g − λN +
(
ε− c2(ρ− r + g − λN )
) ∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t ξnt dt
+
(
c1(ρ− r + g − λ1)− ε
) ∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t ηnt dt.
Therefore, by taking ε = c1(ρ− r+ g−λ1) in the above expression, and using Assumption 2.5, we obtain
Φn >− κε
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
Mt
dt+
ρ− r + g − λ1
ρ− r + g − λN c1x =: Λ.
The fact that Λ is clearly an integrable random variable, independent of n, completes the proof. 
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The previous theorem ensures existence and uniqueness of an optimal debt ratio management policy,
but it does not directly provide its structure. To determine the form of the optimal debt ratio management
policy, we now exploit the result of Theorem 3.4 and we relate the optimal debt management problem to
a two person zero-sum game of optimal stopping with regime switching.
We now provide a probabilistic representation of Vx.
Proposition 3.5. For any (x, i) ∈ O set
(3.15)
Ψx,i(τ, θ) := E
[ ∫ τ∧θ
0
e
− ∫ t0 ρY is dsX1,i,0t hx(xX1,i,0t , Y it )dt+c2e− ∫ τ0 ρY is dsX1,i,0τ 1{τ<θ}+c1e− ∫ θ0 ρY is dsX1,i,0θ 1{θ<τ}],
for a couple of F-stopping times (τ, θ). Then,
(3.16) Vx(x, i) = v(x, i), (x, i) ∈ O,
where v is the value function of the zero-sum Dynkin game with regime switching
(3.17) v(x, i) := sup
τ≥0
inf
θ≥0
Ψx,i(τ, θ) = inf
θ≥0
sup
τ≥0
Ψx,i(τ, θ), (x, i) ∈ O.
Proof. For any (x, i) ∈ O, t ≥ 0 and ω ∈ Ω, recall (2.2) and set
H(ω, t, x) := e
− ∫ t0 ρY is (ω)dsh(x ·X1,i,0t (ω), Y it (ω)),
νt(ω) := c1e
− ∫ t0 ρY is (ω)dsX1,i,0t (ω), γt(ω) := −c2e−
∫ t
0 ρY is (ω)
ds
X1,i,0t (ω).(3.18)
Due to Assumptions 3.2 and 2.3, and standard estimates, it is easy to check that
(i) E
[
sup
t≥0
|γt|+ sup
t≥0
|νt|
]
<∞, (ii) E
[ ∫ ∞
0
|Hx(ω, t, x)|dt
]
<∞.
We thus have that the integrability conditions required in equation (2.4) of [20] are satisfied, and we
can therefore apply Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 of [20] together with our Theorem 3.4 in order to conclude.
In fact, going through the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 of [20], one should notice that the required
nonnegativity of the process γ is not necessary. The arguments of those proofs still work in the case (as in
the present paper) in which γ is negative (cf. (3.18)) and E
[
supt≥0 |γt|
]
< ∞. Moreover, it is important
to remark that in [20] the set of admissible controls does not require that the controlled process remains
positive. However, the proof of Theorem 3.2 therein is based on the construction of suitable perturbations
of the optimal control and one may easily verify that such perturbations of the optimal control preserve
positivity of the process provided that the optimal control does. 
This game might be interpreted as a game played between the two components of the government;
namely, player 1 (inf–player choosing θ) represents the will to adopt a restrictive debt policy and player
2 (sup–player choosing τ) represents the desire to increase spending.
4. The Associated Optimal Stopping Game
In this section we will study the Dynkin game with regime switching with value (3.17). In particular,
we will characterise the saddle point of the game as a couple of hitting times of two regime dependent
boundaries, and we will prove global C1-regularity of v(·, i) for any i ∈ M. This study will be crucial
for the identification of the optimal control of problem (2.7), completely characterising the optimal debt
management policy of the government, developed in Section 5.
For the subsequent analysis, we define the process
(4.1) ρ̂t :=
∫ t
0
(ρYs − λYs)ds− (r − g)t, t ≥ 0,
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and let P̂ be the measure on (Ω,F) such that
(4.2)
dP̂
dP
∣∣∣
Ft
= Mt , for t ≥ 0, with Mt := exp
{
− 1
2
σ2t+ σWt
}
,
and denote by Ê(x,i) the expectation under P̂ conditioned on X0 = x and Y0 = i, for (x, i) ∈ O. Notice
that for any t ≥ 0, we can rewrite Xx,i,0 from (2.2) as
(4.3) Xx,i,0t = x exp
{
(r − g)t+
∫ t
0
λY is ds
}
Mt = x exp
{∫ t
0
ρY is ds− ρ̂t
}
Mt.
In view of the change of measure in (4.2), we have by Girsanov’s theorem that W˜t := Wt−σt is a standard
F-Brownian motion under P̂, and we introduce the process (cf. (2.2))
(4.4) X̂x,i,0t = xe
(r−g+ 1
2
σ2)t+
∫ t
0 λY is
ds+σW˜t , t ≥ 0.
Moreover, we can rewrite (cf. (3.17))
(4.5) v(x, i) = sup
τ≥0
inf
θ≥0
Ψ̂x,i(τ, θ) = inf
θ≥0
sup
τ≥0
Ψ̂x,i(τ, θ), (x, i) ∈ O,
where for every couple of F-stopping times (τ, θ) we have set
(4.6) Ψ̂x,i(τ, θ) := Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ τ∧θ
0
e−ρ̂thx
(
X̂0t , Yt
)
dt+ c2e
−ρ̂τ1{τ<θ} + c1e−ρ̂θ1{θ<τ}
]
.
with ρ̂· given by (4.1).
It is easy to see that since ρ > r − g + λ1 by Assumption 3.2, then limt↑∞ e−ρ̂t = 0, P̂-a.s.. Therefore,
in the rest of this section, for any F-stopping time ζ we will adopt the convention
e−ρ̂ζ := 0 on {ζ = +∞}.
From (4.5)–(4.6) it is readily seen that c2 ≤ v(x, i) ≤ c1. Using the general theory of optimal stopping
for Markov processes (see, e.g., Chapter 2 of [24]) define the continuation region
C := {(x, i) ∈ O : c2 < v(x, i) < c1},
and the stopping regions
S1 := {(x, i) ∈ O : v(x, i) ≥ c1}, and S2 := {(x, i) ∈ O : v(x, i) ≤ c2}.
Here C is the region in which no player has an incentive to stop the evolution of the process (X̂0, Y ),
whereas Sj , j = 1, 2, is the region in which it is optimal for player j to stop.
Since x 7→ X̂x,i,0t is P̂-a.s. increasing (cf. (4.4)), it follows from (4.5) that x 7→ v(x, i) is increasing for
any i ∈M due to the convexity of h(·, i). Hence we can introduce the free boundaries
(4.7) a(i) := inf{x ≥ 0 : v(x, i) > c2} and b(i) := sup{x ≥ 0 : v(x, i) < c1},
(with the usual convention sup ∅ = 0 and inf ∅ = +∞), and we have that O = R+ ×M is split into
continuation and stopping regions completely determined by a and b; that is,
C = {(x, i) ∈ O : a(i) < x < b(i)}, S1 = {(x, i) ∈ O : x ≥ b(i)}, S2 = {(x, i) ∈ O : x ≤ a(i)}.
The Markov process (X̂0, Y ) has ca`dla`g paths and it is of Feller type by [30] (see Lemma 3.6 and
Theorem 3.10 therein). Hence its paths are right-continuous and quasi-left-continuous (i.e. left-continuous
over predictable stopping times), and by Theorem 2.1 of [14] we know that P̂(x,i)-a.s., for any (x, i) ∈ O,
the two stopping times
(4.8) θ? := inf{t ≥ 0 : (X̂0t , Yt) ∈ S1} and τ? := inf{t ≥ 0 : (X̂0t , Yt) ∈ S2},
form a saddle point for the game (4.5) (here the usual convention inf ∅ = +∞ applies). Moreover, by
easily adapting the results of Theorem 2.1 in [25] to our case with running cost hx, we also have the
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following probabilistic characterisation of v. Such a result is usually referred to as the semi-harmonic
characterisation of v.
Proposition 4.1. For any (x, i) ∈ O, we have under P̂(x,i) that
(i)
( ∫ t∧τ?
0 e
−ρ̂shx
(
X̂0s , , Ys
)
ds+ e−ρ̂t∧τ?v(X̂0t∧τ? , Yt∧τ?)
)
t≥0 is a right-continuous F-submartingale;
(ii)
( ∫ t∧θ?
0 e
−ρ̂shx
(
X̂0s , , Ys
)
ds+ e−ρ̂t∧θ?v(X̂0t∧θ? , Yt∧θ?)
)
t≥0 is a right-continuous F-supermartingale;
(iii)
( ∫ t∧θ?∧τ?
0 e
−ρ̂shx
(
X̂0s , Ys
)
ds+e−ρ̂t∧θ?∧τ?v(X̂0t∧θ?∧τ? , Yt∧θ?∧τ?)
)
t≥0 is a right-continuous F-martingale;
The following proposition rules out the possibility that the stopping regions are empty, thus the bound-
aries a(i) and b(i) from (4.7) exist and are finite under any regime i ∈M, and the optimal stopping times
in (4.8), forming the Nash-equilibrium, are well-defined.
Proposition 4.2. The following hold true:
(i) S1 6= ∅ and S2 6= ∅;
(ii) there exist constants 0 < a1 < b1 < +∞ and 0 < aN < bN < +∞, with a1 ≤ aN and b1 ≤ bN ,
such that for all i ∈M we have a1 ≤ a(i) ≤ aN and b1 ≤ b(i) ≤ bN .
Proof. We prove the two claims separately.
Proof of (i). We argue by contradiction and we suppose that S1 = ∅. This implies that θ? = +∞
P̂(x,i)-a.s. for any (x, i) ∈ O and therefore
c1 > v(x, i) = sup
τ≥0
Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ τ
0
e−ρ̂thx
(
X̂0t , Yt
)
dt+ c2e
−ρ̂τ
]
≥ Ê
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρ̂thx
(
x · X̂1,i,0t , Yt
)
dt+ c2e
−ρ̂T
]
,
for T > 0 deterministic. By letting x ↑ ∞, and recalling that hx(x, i) ↑ ∞ by Assumption 2.3, we obtain
by the monotone convergence theorem that the last expected value diverges to +∞, thus leading to a
contradiction.
Given that we allow the process X̂0 to start from x = 0 at time t = 0, in which case X̂0t ≡ 0 for all
t ≥ 0, P̂-a.s., and hx(0, i) = 0 by Assumption 2.3-(ii), we clearly have that v(0, i) = c2 for any i ∈ M.
That is, the minimiser chooses θ? = +∞ and the maximiser τ? = 0 in (4.8). Thus, (0, i) ∈ S2 for any
i ∈M, which yields that the stopping set S2 6= ∅.
Proof of (ii). Since λYt ∈ [λN , λ1] and ρYt ∈ [ρ, ρ], P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0 (see Assumption 2.1), it is
straightforward to see that vN (x) ≤ v(x, i) ≤ v1(x), for all x ≥ 0, i ∈ M. The bounds vk(x), for
k ∈ {1, N}, are defined by
vk(x) := sup
τ≥0
inf
θ≥0
Ξ(k)x (τ, θ) = inf
θ≥0
sup
τ≥0
Ξ(k)x (τ, θ),(4.9)
with
Ξ(1)x (τ, θ) := Ê
[ ∫ τ∧θ
0
e−(ρ−λ1−r+g)t max
i
hx
(
Z
(1),x
t , i
)
dt+ c2e
−(ρ−λ1−r+g)τ1{τ<θ} + c1e−(ρ−λ1−r+g)θ1{θ<τ}
]
Ξ(N)x (τ, θ) := Ê
[ ∫ τ∧θ
0
e−(ρ−λN−r+g)t min
i
hx
(
Z
(N),x
t , i
)
dt+ c2e
−(ρ−λN−r+g)τ1{τ<θ} + c1e−(ρ−λN−r+g)θ1{θ<τ}
]
for Z
(k),x
t = x exp{(r − g + 12σ2 + λk)t + σW˜t}, for all t ≥ 0. By defining the free boundaries of the
one-dimensional (without regime switching) zero-sum optimal stopping games (4.9), for any k ∈ {1, N},
by
ak := inf{x ≥ 0 : vk(x) > c2} and bk := sup{x ≥ 0 : vk(x) < c1},
we apply standard means to prove that these constants exist and are such that 0 < ak < bk < +∞
(compare also with our analysis of Section 6.3). Moreover, a1 ≤ aN and b1 ≤ bN . Thus, using the fact
that vN (x) ≤ v(x, i) ≤ v1(x), it is easy to see that a1 ≤ a(i) ≤ aN and b1 ≤ b(i) ≤ bN , which completes
the proof. 
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For any i ∈M introduce the i-sections for C, S1 and S1 as
Ci := {x ≥ 0 : (x, i) ∈ C} and Sij := {x ≥ 0 : (x, i) ∈ Sj}, for j = 1, 2.
The next result proves regularity of x 7→ v(x, i) for any i ∈M.
Theorem 4.3. For any i ∈M,
(i) v(·, i) ∈ C2((Ci ∪ Si1 ∪ Si2) \ {a(i), b(i)});
(ii) v(·, i) ∈ C1(R+).
Proof. We prove the two parts separately.
Proof of (i). Clearly, for any i ∈ M, v(·, i) ∈ C2(Si1 ∪ Si2) \ {a(i), b(i)} since v ≡ c1 in Si1 \ {b(i)} and
v ≡ c2 in Si2 \ {a(i)}. Thus, what remains to be proved is that v(·, i) ∈ C2(Ci), which is presented below.
Let i ∈ M be given and fixed, and let α < β such that [α, β] ⊂ Ci = {x ≥ 0 : a(i) < x < b(i)}. Then,
setting f(x, i) := hx(x, i) +
∑
j 6=i qijv(x, j), for any x ∈ (α, β), consider a function w(·, i) : R+ 7→ R that
solves the ordinary differential equation
1
2
σ2x2wxx(x, i) + (r − g + λi + σ2)xwx(x, i)−
(
ρi − λi − r + g − qii
)
w(x, i) = −f(x, i),(4.10)
with boundary conditions w(α, i) = v(α, i) and w(β, i) = v(β, i). Since x ≥ α > a(i) > 0, the differential
operator in (4.10) is uniformly elliptic and the solution w of the above Dirichlet problem is unique and is
such that w(·, i) ∈ C2((α, β)). Then, using this function w and recalling that i ∈ M is given and fixed,
define the function w : (α, β)×M 7→ R as follows:
(4.11) w(x, j) :=
{
w(x, i) if j = i
v(x, j) if j 6= i.
In addition, for x ∈ (α, β), let τα,β := inf{t ≥ 0 : X̂x,i,0t /∈ (α, β)}, τ1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Y it 6= i}, and set
ζ := τα,β ∧ τ1. Given that Yt = i for all t < ζ, Dynkin’s formula yields that
(4.12) w(x, i) = w(x, i) = Ê(x,i)
[
e−ρ̂ζv(X̂0ζ , Yζ) +
∫ ζ
0
e−ρ̂thx(X̂0t , i)dt
]
,
due to (4.11), which implies that w(X̂0ζ , Yζ) = v(X̂
0
ζ , Yζ), and (4.10), which implies that
1
2
σ2x2wxx(x, i) + (r − g + λi + σ2)xwx(x, i)−
(
ρi − λi − r + g
)
w(x, i)
+
∑
j 6=i
qij
[
w(x, j)− w(x, i)] + hx(x, i)
=
1
2
σ2x2wxx(x, i) + (r − g + λi + σ2)xwx(x, i) −
(
ρi − λi − r + g − qii
)
w(x, i) + f(x, i) = 0.
However, since [α, β] ⊂ Ci, we have ζ ≤ τ? ∧ θ?, hence it follows from Proposition 4.1-(iii), that the
right-hand side of (4.12) is equal to v(x, i). Therefore, w ≡ v in (α, β) ×M by the arbitrariness of i.
Also, by the arbitrariness of (α, β), we conclude that w = v in C, hence v(·, i) ∈ C2(Ci) for any i ∈M.
Proof of (ii). We first prove that v(·, i) ∈ C0(R+) for any i ∈ M. Since x 7→ v(x, i) is increasing, we
get for any arbitrary ε ∈ (0, 1) and (x, i) ∈ O that
0 ≤ v(x+ ε, i)− v(x, i) ≤ Ê
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρ̂t
∣∣hx((x+ ε) · X̂1,i,0t , Y it )− hx(x · X̂1,i,0t , Y it )∣∣dt].(4.13)
Since |hx((x+ ε) · X̂1,i,0t , Y it )− hx(x · X̂1,i,0t , Y it )| ≤ 2hx((x+ 1) · X̂1,i,0t , Y it ), P̂-a.s. and Ê[
∫∞
0 e
−ρ̂thx
(
(x+
1) · X̂1,i,0t , Y it
)
dt] < ∞ due to Assumptions 2.3-(iii) and 3.2, we can take limits as ε ↓ 0 and invoke the
dominated convergence theorem in (4.13) to obtain the claimed continuity of v(·, i) for any i ∈M.
In view of the result in part (i) and of the continuity of v proved above, it suffices to show that vx(·, i)
is continuous across the free boundaries a(i) and b(i), for any i ∈ M. We provide details only for the
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continuity of vx(x, i) at x = a(i). Similar arguments apply to show also the continuity of vx(x, i) at
x = b(i).
Take again an arbitrary (x, i) ∈ C, set θ? := θ?(x, i) = inf{t ≥ 0 : X̂x,i,0t ≥ b(Y it )} and for a sufficiently
small ε > 0, set τ?ε := τ
?(x + ε, i) = inf{t ≥ 0 : X̂x+ε,i,0t ≤ a(Y it )}. Then, recalling that x 7→ v(x, i) is
increasing, we can write by Assumption 2.3-(iii)
0 ≤ v(x+ ε, i)− v(x, i)
ε
≤ 1
ε
Ê
[ ∫ τ?ε ∧θ?
0
e−ρ̂t
∣∣∣hx((x+ ε) · X̂1,i,0t , Y it )− hx(x · X̂1,i,0t , Y it )∣∣∣dt]
≤ K3 Ê
[ ∫ τ?ε ∧θ?
0
e−ρ̂tX̂1,i,0t
[
1 +
(
X̂x+ε,i,0t
)(m−2)+]
dt
]
.
Letting ε ↓ 0, noticing that τ?ε → τ?, P̂-a.s., and invoking the dominated convergence theorem thanks to
Assumption 3.2 yields
0 ≤ vx(x, i) ≤ K3 Ê
[ ∫ τ?∧θ?
0
e−ρ̂tX̂1,i,0t
[
1 + x(m−2)
+ · (X̂1,i,0t )(m−2)+]dt].
Then by taking limits as x ↓ a(i) in the latter expression we obtain vx(a(i)+, i) = 0. Given that v(x, i) = c2
for all x ≤ a(i) we conclude that vx(·, i) is continuous at x = a(i). 
5. The Optimal Debt Management Rule
Combining Theorem 4.3 with Proposition 3.5 we immediately have for any i ∈ M, that V (·, i) ∈
C2(R+). Hence by the Dynamic Programming Principle (see, e.g., [15], Chapter VIII.5; see also [3], in
particular Remarks 3.10 and 3.11, for a proof in a very general setting)
V (x, i) = inf
ϕ∈A
E(x,i)
[
e−
∫ τ
0 ρYsdsV (Xϕτ , Yτ ) +
∫ τ
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsh(Xϕt , Yt)dt+
∫ τ
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds
(
c1dηt − c2dξt
)]
,
for any F-stopping time τ , V identifies with a classical solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation
(5.1) min
{(G − ρi)V (x, i) + h(x, i),−c2 + Vx(x, i), c1 − Vx(x, i)} = 0, (x, i) ∈ O.
Here G is the infinitesimal generator of (X0, Y ), which acts on functions f : O → R with f(·, i) ∈ C2(R)
for any given and fixed i ∈M as
(5.2) Gf(x, i) := 1
2
σ2x2fxx(x, i) + (r − g + λi)xfx(x, i) +
∑
j 6=i
qij
[
f(x, j)− f(x, i)].
It is worth noting that, due to (5.2), equation (5.1) is actually a system of variational inequalities, coupled
through the transition rates qij .
In what follows, we will use the optimal boundaries a(·) and b(·) of (4.7), which define the value function
of the associated optimal stopping game in (3.17) (equivalently, (4.5)), in order to construct the optimal
debt ratio management policy for the original problem (2.7).
To that end, recall the boundaries a(·) and b(·) of (4.7), let x ∈ [a(i), b(i)], i ∈M and denote by U˜ the
set of right-continuous adapted nondecreasing processes starting from 0 at initial time. Then consider the
two-sided Skorokhod reflection problem SP(a, b;x, i) defined as:
Find (ξ˜, η˜) ∈ U˜ × U˜ s.t.

Xx,i,ϕ˜t ∈ [a(Yt), b(Yt)], P-a.s. for all t > 0,∫ T
0
1{Xx,i,ϕ˜t >a(Yt)}dξ˜t = 0, P-a.s. for any T > 0,∫ T
0
1{Xx,i,ϕ˜t <b(Yt)}dη˜t = 0, P-a.s. for any T > 0,
(SP(a, b;x, i))
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where we set ϕ˜ := ξ˜ − η˜. Such a problem admits a unique solution (ξ˜?, η˜?); indeed, recalling (3.1) and
(3.2), we can apply Proposition 2.3, Corollary 2.4 and Theorem 2.6 in [4] by setting, in the notation of
that paper, φ(t) := Xx,i,ϕ˜t /X
x,i,0
t , ψ(t) := x, η`(t) :=
∫ t
0
dξ˜s
Xx,i,0s
, ηr(t) :=
∫ t
0
dη˜s
Xx,i,0s
, `(t) := a(Yt)/X
x,i,0
t and
r(t) := b(Yt)/X
x,i,0
t (see also [8] for another example of a regime dependent Skorokhod problem).
We denote ϕ˜? := ξ˜?− η˜? and we notice that supp{dξ˜?}∩supp{dη˜?} = ∅, since a(i) < b(i) for any i ∈M
(see Proposition 4.2). Then, for any (x, i) ∈ O define the control (here and in the rest of the paper, ( · )+
denotes the positive part)
(5.3)
{
ϕ? := ξ? − η? such that ξ?0 = 0 = η?0, P− a.s., where for any t > 0,
ξ?t := (a(i)− x)+ + ξ˜?t− and η?t := (x− b(i))+ + η˜?t−.
The remaining of this section is dedicated to proving the optimality of the control (5.3) for the original
debt ratio management problem (2.7).
Before doing so, it is worth noticing that the debt ratio management policy prescribed by the controls
in (5.3) involves two types of actions by the government:
(a) Small-scale actions employed when the debt ratio Xt approaches, at any time t ≥ 0, either boundary
a(Yt) from above or boundary b(Yt) from below. The purpose of these measures is to make sure (with a
minimal effort) that the debt ratio level Xt is kept inside the interval [a(Yt), b(Yt)]. Mathematically, these
are the actions caused by the continuous parts ξ?,cont and η?,cont of the controls ξ? and η?, respectively
(Skorokhod reflection-type policies);
(b) Large-scale actions employed when the debt ratio Xt, at any time t ≥ 0, is either below the boundary
a(Yt) or above the boundary b(Yt). The purpose of these measures is to bring immediately the debt ratio
level Xt back inside the interval [a(Yt), b(Yt)]. Mathematically, these are the actions caused at time t = 0,
by the initial jumps (a(i)− x)+ and (x− b(i))+, or at any time t > 0, by the jump parts ∆ξ?t := ξ?t+ − ξ?t
and ∆η?t := η
?
t+ − η?t of the controls ξ? and η?, respectively (Lump-sum-type policies).
Remark 5.1. Note that, the large-scale actions mentioned in (b) above, caused by the jump parts ∆ξ?t and
∆η?t of the controls for t > 0, will only be needed at times of jumps of the macroeconomic regime switching
process Yt. These are the only times when the debt ratio level Xt may exit the interval [a(Yt), b(Yt)]. This
is an interesting feature, coming from the inclusion of regime switching macroeconomic factors in the
model, not usually observed in bounded-variation stochastic control problems without regime switching,
where a lump-sum action may be required only at time t = 0 (see, e.g., [17], among others).
In order to illustrate the argument in Remark 5.1, consider the following example. Suppose that time
T is a jump time from the initial economic regime YT− = i to a “worse” one YT = j. Suppose also that,
immediately before the jump, the debt ratio was inside the required bounds (i.e. a(i) < XT− < b(i)), but
after the jump it ends up above the new upper bound under the new regime j (i.e. a(j) < b(j) < XT ).
In this case, the optimal debt ratio management policy of the government, which was “just observing”
(no-action) before the regime change, will now require a lump-sum type of austerity policy, e.g. with a
large-scale spending cut, that can decrease the debt ratio level by ∆ξ?T = XT − b(j).
We now proceed with the next lemma showing the admissibility of the control ϕ? in (5.3).
Lemma 5.2. For any (x, i) ∈ O, we have ϕ? ∈ A(x, i).
Proof. Clearly ϕ? ∈ V. Also, for any (x, i) ∈ O, we have Xx,i,ϕ?t ≥ 0, P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0 since b(i) >
a(i) > 0. It thus remains only to show that
(5.4) E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds
(
dξ?t + dη
?
t
)]
<∞.
Notice that (5.3) yields
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds
(
dξ?t + dη
?
t
)]
= (a(i)− x)+ + (x− b(i))+ + E(z(x,i),i)
[ ∫ ∞
0+
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds
(
dξ˜?t + dη˜
?
t
)]
,
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where z(x, i) = x if x ∈ (a(i), b(i)), z(x, i) = a(i) if x ≤ a(i) and z(x, i) = b(i) if x ≥ b(i). Hence, to have
(5.4) it suffices to prove that
E(z,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds
(
dξ˜?t + dη˜
?
t
)]
<∞,
for any z ∈ [a(i), b(i)]. In the following we only prove that
(5.5) E(z,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdξ˜?t
]
<∞, (z, i) ∈ [a(i), b(i)]×M,
since analogous arguments can be employed to show that E(z,i)[
∫∞
0 e
− ∫ t0 ρYsdsdη˜?t ] <∞.
To prove (5.5) we adapt arguments from [27]. Let X˜ := X ϕ˜
?
and g : R×M→ R be any solution to(G − ρi)g(x, i) = 0.
Then, take a fixed T > 0 and let 0 ≤ T1 < T2 < ... < TM ≤ T be the random times of jumps of Y in the
interval [0, T ] (clearly, the number M of those jumps is random as well). Notice that the times Tn, for
n = 1, . . . ,M , of regime changes are the only possible jump times of ϕ˜?, as discussed in Remark 5.1.
By the regularity of g we can apply Itoˆ-Meyer’s formula for semimartingales ([22], pp. 278–301) to the
process (e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsg(X˜t, Yt))t≥0 on each of the intervals [0, T1), (T1, T2),...,(TM , T ]. Piecing together all
the terms as in the proof of Lemma 3 at p. 104 of [28], we obtain
E(z,i)
[
e−
∫ T
0 ρYsdsg(X˜T , YT )
]
− g(z, i) = E(z,i)
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsgx(X˜t, Yt)dξ˜
?,cont
t
](5.6)
− E(z,i)
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsgx(X˜t, Yt)dη˜
?,cont
t
]
+ E(z,i)
[ ∑
0≤Tn≤T
e−
∫ Tn
0 ρYsds
(
g(X˜Tn , YTn)− g(X˜Tn−, YTn)
)]
.
Observe that, the latter expectation in (5.6) can be written as
E(z,i)
[ ∑
0≤Tn≤T
e−
∫ Tn
0 ρYsds
(
g(X˜Tn , YTn)− g(X˜Tn−, YTn)
)]
= E(z,i)
[ ∑
0≤Tn≤T
e−
∫ Tn
0 ρYsds
(
1{∆ξ˜?Tn>0}
+ 1{∆η˜?Tn>0}
)(
g(X˜Tn , YTn)− g(X˜Tn−, YTn)
)]
(5.7)
= E(z,i)
[ ∑
0≤Tn≤T
e−
∫ Tn
0 ρYsds
(∫ ∆ξ˜?Tn
0
gx(X˜Tn− + u, YTn)du−
∫ ∆η˜?Tn
0
gx(X˜Tn− − u, YTn)du
)]
.
Impose now that gx(a(i), i) = −1 and gx(b(i), i) = 0, and extend the function g on (−∞, a(i))∪(b(i),∞)
so that gx(x, i) = −1 for any x < a(i) and gx(x, i) = 0 for any x > b(i) (for example, set g(x, i) := a(i)−
x+g(a(i), i) for x < a(i) and g(x, i) = g(b(i), i) for x > b(i)). Then, since ξ˜?· is flat off {t ≥ 0 : X˜t ≤ a(Yt)}
and η˜· is flat off {t ≥ 0 : X˜t ≥ b(Yt)} (cf. Problem SP(a, b; z, i)), we get{
gx(X˜t, Yt)dξ˜
?,cont
t = −dξ˜?,contt and gx(X˜t, Yt)dη˜?,contt = 0,∫ ∆ξ˜?Tn
0 gx(X˜Tn− + u, YTn)du = −∆ξ˜?Tn and
∫ ∆η˜?Tn
0 gx(X˜Tn− − u, YTn)du = 0.
(5.8)
Therefore, by substituting (5.8) in (5.7) and then (5.6), we get that
(5.9) E(z,i)
[
e−
∫ T
0 ρYsdsg(X˜T , YT )
]
− g(z, i) = −E(z,i)
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdξ˜?t
]
.
Finally, given that g(X˜T , YT ) ≤ maxi∈M supx∈[minj a(j),maxj b(j)] g(x, i), P(x,i)-a.s., we can let T ↑ ∞, and
apply the dominated convergence theorem on the left-hand side of (5.9) and the monotone convergence
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theorem on its right-hand side, to obtain
g(z, i) = E(z,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsdξ˜?t
]
.
The finiteness of the function g constructed above, yields (5.5). 
Thanks to the admissibility of ϕ? we can now prove its optimality.
Theorem 5.3. The admissible ϕ? = ξ? − η? of (5.3) is optimal for the problem (2.7).
Proof. It suffices to show that J(x,i)(ϕ?) = V (x, i) for any (x, i) ∈ O. In order to simplify notation from
now on we write X? ≡ Xϕ? , P(x,i)-a.s.
Fix (x, i) ∈ O, and take arbitrary T > 0. Let 0 ≤ T1 < T2 < ... < TM < T be the random times
of jumps of Y in the interval [0, T ) (clearly, the number M of those jumps is random as well). By the
regularity of V we can apply Itoˆ-Meyer’s formula to the process (e−ρtV (X?t , Yt))t≥0 (see also proof of
Lemma 5.2), and taking expectations we get
V (x, i) = E(x,i)
[
e−
∫ T
0 ρYsdsV (X?T , YT )−
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds(G − ρ)V (X?t , Yt)dt
](5.10)
− E(x,i)
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsVx(X
?
t , Yt)
(
dξ?,contt − dη?,contt
)]
− E(x,i)
[ ∑
0≤t<T
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds
(
V (X?t+, Yt)− V (X?t , Yt)
) ]
,
where we used the facts that the expectation of the stochastic integral vanishes sinceX?t ∈ [mini a(i),maxi b(i)]
and Vx(·, i) is continuous.
Recall now that V solves (5.1) and Vx = v by (3.16), with v as in (3.17). Hence, since X
?
t ∈ [a(Yt), b(Yt)],
P(x,i)-a.s. for a.e. t > 0, we have that (G − ρYt)V (X?t , Yt) = −h(X?t , Yt) P(x,i)-a.s. for a.e. t ≥ 0. Fur-
thermore, notice that (ξ?, η?) solve the Skorokhod reflection problem, and therefore {t : dξ?t (ω) > 0} ⊆
{t : X?t (ω) ≤ a(Yt(ω))} and {t : dη?t (ω) > 0} ⊆ {t : X?t (ω) ≥ b(Yt(ω))} for any ω ∈ Ω. Then, because
Vx(x, i) = c2 for x ≤ a(i) and Vx(x, i) = c1 for x ≥ b(i), we obtain from (5.10) (see also (5.7)) that
V (x, i) =E(x,i)
[
e−
∫ T
0 ρYsdsV (X?T , YT )
]
+ E(x,i)
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsh(X?t , Yt)dt+
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds
(
c1dη
?
t − c2dξ?t
)]
.
(5.11)
Since X?t ∈ [mini a(i),maxi b(i)] and V (·, i) is continuous, applying the dominated convergence theorem
gives limT↑∞ E(x,i)[e−
∫ T
0 ρYsdsV (X?T , YT )] = 0. Hence, taking limits as T → ∞ in the second expectation
on the right-hand side of (5.11), and invoking the monotone convergence theorem, together with Lemma
5.2 and (2.6), we find
V (x, i) =E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsdsh(X?t , Yt)dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 ρYsds
(
c1dη
?
t − c2dξ?t
)]
= J(x,i)(ϕ?).
The latter shows optimality of ϕ? = ξ? − η? and thus completes the proof. 
Remark 5.4. Notice that the unique optimal debt ratio management policy ϕ? from (5.3) is also optimal
in the larger class of admissible controls
{
ϕ ∈ V : E[∫∞0 e− ∫ t0 ρYsds(dηt + dξt)] < ∞}, when we allow for
X to become negative. In this paper we have however formulated the optimal debt management problem
over the more economically relevant class A.
6. Further Results in a Case Study
In this section we further develop our analysis in the case of regime switching only in the debt ratio
dynamics. We henceforth assume that ρi ≡ ρ (with ρ := ρ = ρ) and h(·, i) ≡ h(·) for all i ∈M.
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6.1. The Geometry of the State Space. In this subsection we study the geometry of the problem’s
state space. More precisely, we prove that the free boundaries a(i) and b(i) – that are associated to the
Dynkin game with value v(x, i) (cf. Section 4) and trigger the optimal control rule – admit a particular
ordering across the different states of the economy.
Recall the Markov process (X̂0, Y ) (cf. (4.4)) of Section 4, and denote by L its infinitesimal generator
as the second-order differential operator, acting for any i ∈M on functions u(·, i) ∈ C2(R), given by
Lu(x, i) := 1
2
σ2x2uxx(x, i) + (r − g + λi + σ2)xux(x, i) +
∑
j 6=i
qij
[
u(x, j)− u(x, i)].
Then, from standard arguments based on the strong Markov property, and from Proposition 4.1, Proposi-
tion 4.2 and Theorem 4.3, it follows that for any i ∈M, the triplet (v(·, i), a(i), b(i)) satisfies the following
free-boundary problem(L − (ρ− (r − g + λi)))v(x, i) = −hx(x), a(i) < x < b(i),(6.1) (L − (ρ− (r − g + λi)))v(x, i) ≤ −hx(x), x < b(i),(6.2) (L − (ρ− (r − g + λi)))v(x, i) ≥ −hx(x), x > a(i),(6.3)
v(x, i) = c2, x ≤ a(i),(6.4)
v(x, i) = c1, x ≥ b(i).(6.5)
Moreover, v(·, i) ∈ C1(R+) for any i ∈M and vxx(·, i) ∈ L∞loc(R+) for any i ∈M.
Proposition 6.1. The following hold true:
(i) a(N) ≥ a(N − 1) ≥ · · · ≥ a(1) and b(1) ≤ b(2) ≤ · · · ≤ b(N);
(ii) a(N) < b(1).
Proof. We prove the two parts separately.
Proof of (i). From (4.5) it is easily seen that v(x, 1) ≥ v(x, 2) ≥ · · · ≥ v(x,N) since λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λN .
This in particular implies that {x ≥ 0 : v(x,N) > c2} ⊆ · · · ⊆ {x ≥ 0 : v(x, 2) > c2} ⊆ {x ≥ 0 : v(x, 1) >
c2} and therefore, in view of (4.7), we know that a(N) ≥ a(N − 1) ≥ · · · ≥ a(1).
Analogous arguments show that b(1) ≤ b(2) ≤ · · · ≤ b(N).
Proof of (ii). We argue by contradiction and we suppose that b(1) < a(N).
On one hand, any x ∈ (b(1), a(N)) is such that x > b(1) > a(1) and v(x, 1) = c1 (cf. (4.7)). Therefore
(6.3) and (6.5) yield
(6.6) − (ρ− µ1)c1 +∑
j 6=1
q1jv(x, j) + q11c1 + hx(x) ≥ 0,
where we used the equality
∑
j 6=1 q1j = −q11 and set µ1 := r + λ1 − g.
On the other hand, we also have that, any x ∈ (b(1), a(N)) is such that x < a(N) < b(N) and
v(x,N) = c2 (cf. (4.7)). Hence, (6.2) and (6.4) give
(6.7) − (ρ− µN)c2 + ∑
j 6=N
qNjv(x, j) + qNNc2 + hx(x) ≤ 0,
where we used the equality
∑
j 6=N qNj = −qNN and set µN := r + λN − g.
In all, it follows from (6.6)–(6.7) that, for any x ∈ (b(1), a(N)),
FN (x) := −
(
ρ− µN
)
c2 +
∑
j 6=N
qNjv(x, j) + qNNc2 + hx(x)
≤ 0 ≤ −(ρ− µ1)c1 +∑
j 6=1
q1jv(x, j) + q11c1 + hx(x) =: G1(x).(6.8)
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Notice now that, by taking into account the inequalities c2 ≤ v(x, j) ≤ c1 for any (x, j) ∈ O, together
with Assumption 2.5, we obtain for any x ∈ (b(1), a(N)) that
G1(x) ≤ −
(
ρ− µ1
)
c1 + hx(x) < −
(
ρ− µN
)
c2 + hx(x) ≤ FN (x),
which in view of (6.8) leads to a contradiction. 
Proposition 6.1 has the important consequence of characterising the geometry of continuation and
stopping regions. This fact, combined with the regularity of the value function v(·, i) proved in Theorem
4.3, provides an operative method to determine the free boundaries a(i) and b(i), i ∈ M. Indeed, since
for any i ∈ M we have that v(·, i) ∈ C1(R+), then v(·, i) must be necessarily continuously differentiable
at the free boundaries a(j) and b(j) for all j ∈M. This yields the following system of nonlinear equations
for the 2N -dimensional vector (a(1), b(1), . . . , a(N), b(N)):
v(a(i)+, i) = c2 and vx(a(i)+, i) = 0, ∀ i ∈M(6.9)
v(b(i)−, i) = c1 and vx(b(i)−, i) = 0, ∀ i ∈M(6.10)
v(a(j)−, i) = v(a(j)+, i) and vx(a(j)−, i) = vx(a(j)+, i), ∀ (i, j) ∈M2 : j > i,(6.11)
v(b(j)−, i) = v(b(j)+, i) and vx(b(j)−, i) = vx(b(j)+, i), ∀ (i, j) ∈M2 : j < i.(6.12)
We will see how to explicitly write the system of equations for the boundaries in the following subsection,
where we study the specific case in which the Markov chain Y has N = 2 states. Using the same steps,
one can similarly write the associate system of equations for the boundaries in any other case of N > 2.
6.2. Explicit Solution in a Case Study with Two Regimes. In this subsection, we consider the
simplest possible regime switching model of debt ratio management. In particular, the continuous-time
Markov chain Y , modelling the macroeconomic conditions affecting the interest rate on debt, has only
N = 2 states; namely, Yt ∈ M := {1, 2}. In view of Assumption 2.1, we have λ1 > λ2. Therefore, the
states 1 and 2 represent the “bad” and “good” scenarios for the government, under which the interest on
debt is “high” and “low”, respectively. We further assume a quadratic running cost function h(x) = x2/2
for all x > 0, which satisfies Assumption 2.3-(i)–(iv); e.g. set m = 2 and K1 = K2 = K3 = 1 in Assumption
2.3-(iii).
Thanks to 3.5, the government which originally aims at solving (2.7), given by
V (x, i) := inf
ϕ∈A
E(x,i)
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
2
(
Xϕt
)2
dt+ c1
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdηt − c2
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdξt
]
, (x, i) ∈ R+ × {1, 2},
can first find the value v(x, i) of the optimal stopping game (3.17) with (3.15) and O ≡ R+ × {1, 2}. In
view of (4.5)–(4.6), v(x, i) can be rewritten as
v(x, i) = sup
τ≥0
inf
θ≥0
Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ τ∧θ
0
e−ρ̂tX̂0t dt+ c2e
−ρ̂τ1{τ<θ} + c1e−ρ̂θ1{θ<τ}
]
= inf
θ≥0
sup
τ≥0
Ê(x,i)
[ ∫ τ∧θ
0
e−ρ̂tX̂0t dt+ c2e
−ρ̂τ1{τ<θ} + c1e−ρ̂θ1{θ<τ}
]
,(6.13)
for all (x, i) ∈ O and ρ̂· given by (4.1). Then, the original value V will follow from the equation (3.16)
and the optimal debt ratio management policy given by (5.3) will involve the boundaries a(1) ≤ a(2) <
b(1) ≤ b(2) (cf. Proposition 6.1) that we obtain by solving (6.13).
6.2.1. Derivation of the Explicit Solution. In the following we write q1 := q12 = −q11 and q2 := q21 = −q22,
as well as ki := ρ+qi−2(r−g+λi)−σ2 for both i = 1, 2. Equation (6.1), used to obtain the value function
v(x, i) of the optimal stopping game, consists of the following coupled ordinary differential equations
1
2
σ2x2vxx(x, 1) + (r − g + λ1 + σ2)xvx(x, 1)− (ρ− r + g − λ1)v(x, 1) + q1
(
v(x, 2)− v(x, 1)) = −x
1
2
σ2x2vxx(x, 2) + (r − g + λ2 + σ2)xvx(x, 2)− (ρ− r + g − λ2)v(x, 2) + q2
(
v(x, 1)− v(x, 2)) = −x
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for all a(1) < x < b(1) and a(2) < x < b(2), respectively, while the value function should also satisfy the
four conditions in (6.9)–(6.12) at the boundaries a(i) and b(i), for i = 1, 2 (see also the final paragraph of
Section 6.1 for more details).
Solving the system of ordinary differential equations we get that
v(x, 1) =

c2 , if x ≤ a(1),
A1x
α1 +A2x
α2 + 1k1x+
c2q1
ρ+q1−(r−g+λ1) , if a(1) < x ≤ a(2),
B1x
β1 +B2x
β2 +B3x
β3 +B4x
β4 + q1+k2k1k2−q1q2x , if a(2) < x ≤ b(1),
c1 , if x ≥ b(1)
and
v(x, 2) =

c2 , if x ≤ a(2)
Φ1(β1)
q1
B1x
β1 + Φ1(β2)q1 B2x
β2 + Φ1(β3)q1 B3x
β3 + Φ1(β4)q1 B4x
β4 + k1+q2k1k2−q1q2x , if a(2) < x ≤ b(1),
C1x
γ1 + C2x
γ2 + 1k2x+
c1q2
ρ+q2−(r−g+λ2) , if b(1) < x ≤ b(2),
c1 , if x ≥ b(2),
where the constants α2 < 0 < α1 (under Assumption 3.2 we have α1 > 1) are given by
α1,2 =
1
2
+
r − g + λ1
σ2
±
√(
1
2
+
r − g + λ1
σ2
)2
+
2
(
ρ+ q1 − (r − g + λ1)
)
σ2
,
the constants γ2 < 0 < γ1 (under Assumptions 2.1 and 3.2 we have γ1 > 1) are given by
γ1,2 =
1
2
+
r − g + λ2
σ2
±
√(
1
2
+
r − g + λ2
σ2
)2
+
2
(
ρ+ q2 − (r − g + λ2)
)
σ2
,
and the constants β4 < β3 < 0 < β2 < β1 are the solutions of the characteristic equation Φ1(β) Φ2(β) =
q1 q2 with
Φi(β) =
1
2
σ2β2 +
(
r − g + λi + 1
2
σ2
)
β − (ρ+ qi − (r − g + λi)), for i = 1, 2.
Then, applying the conditions in (6.9) and (6.10) at the boundaries a(i) and b(i), for i = 1, 2, we obtain
the following expressions
Ai ≡ Ai
(
a(1)
)
=
(−1)i+1a−αi(1)
α1 − α2
[
α3−i − 1
k1
a(1)− α3−ic2
(
ρ− (r − g + λ1)
)
ρ+ q1 − (r − g + λ1)
]
,(6.14)
Ci ≡ Ci
(
b(2)
)
=
(−1)i+1b−γi(2)
γ1 − γ2
[
γ3−i − 1
k2
b(2)− γ3−ic1
(
ρ− (r − g + λ2)
)
ρ+ q2 − (r − g + λ2)
]
,(6.15)
for i = 1, 2, as well as
Bi ≡ Bi
(
a(2), b(1)
)
(6.16)
=
∑
j,k,l∈I\{i}:
l 6=j<k 6=l
(−1)k−j+1{l>i}(βj − βk)
[
Φ1(βj)Φ1(βk)
q21
fl,1
(
b(1)
)(a(2)
b(1)
)βj+βk
+ Φ1(βl)q1 fl,2
(
a(2)
)(a(2)
b(1)
)βl]
bβi(1)
∑
j,k,l∈I\{1}:
j 6=k<l 6=j
(−1)j+1(β1 − βj)(βk − βl)
[
Φ1(β1)Φ1(βj)
q21
(
a(2)
b(1)
)β1+βj
+ Φ1(βk)Φ1(βl)
q21
(
a(2)
b(1)
)βk+βl]
for i ∈ I := {1, 2, 3, 4} and
fm,n(x) =
(1− βm)(k3−n + qn)x
k1k2 − q1q2 + βmcn
for m ∈ I and n = 1, 2. Notice that under Assumption 3.2 all the denominators in the formulas above
are nonzero.
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We then apply (6.11)–(6.12) and we obtain
v(a(2)+, 1) = v(a(2)−, 1) & vx(a(2)+, 1) = vx(a(2)−, 1),
v(b(1)+, 2) = v(b(1)−, 2) & vx(b(1)+, 2) = vx(b(1)−, 2).
Using the above conditions for the expressions of v(x, i) for i = 1, 2 with Ai, Ci for i = 1, 2 and Bi for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 given by (6.14)–(6.16), we obtain the boundaries a(i) and b(i) for i = 1, 2 as the solution of
the following system of four arithmetic equations:
2∑
i=1
Ai
(
a(1)
)
aαi(2) =
4∑
i=1
Bi
(
a(2), b(1)
)
aβi(2) +
q1
(
f1,2
(
a(2)
)− β1c2)
(1− β1)k1 −
q1c2
ρ+ q1 − (r − g + λ1)(6.17)
2∑
i=1
αiAi
(
a(1)
)
aαi(2) =
4∑
i=1
βiBi
(
a(2), b(1)
)
aβi(2) +
q1
(
f1,2
(
a(2)
)− β1c2)
(1− β1)k1(6.18)
2∑
i=1
Ci
(
b(2)
)
bγi(1) =
4∑
i=1
Φ1(βi)
q1
Bi
(
a(2), b(1)
)
bβi(1) +
q2
(
f1,1
(
b(1)
)− β1c1)
(1− β1)k2 −
q2c1
ρ+ q2 − (r − g + λ2)(6.19)
2∑
i=1
γiCi
(
b(2)
)
bγi(1) =
4∑
i=1
βi
Φ1(βi)
q1
Bi
(
a(2), b(1)
)
bβi(1) +
q2
(
f1,1
(
b(1)
)− β1c1)
(1− β1)k2(6.20)
Finally, for any i = 1, 2, combining (6.2) with (6.4), and (6.3) with (6.5), we find that the boundaries
a(1), a(2), b(1), b(2) must necessarily be such that
(6.21) x− (ρ+ qi − (r − g + λi))c2 + qiv(x, j) ≤ 0, for j 6= i and x < a(i),
and
(6.22) x− (ρ+ qi − (r − g + λi))c1 + qiv(x, j) ≥ 0, for j 6= i and x > b(i).
The above conditions have the practical use of providing bounds on a(1), a(2), b(1), b(2) that one has to
check on a case by case basis when trying to solve numerically (6.17)–(6.20).
It is worth stressing that one advantage of our direct probabilistic method – compared to the traditional
analytic guess-and-verify one – is that existence of a solution to (6.17)–(6.20) satisfying (6.21)–(6.22)
does not have to be proved, since it follows directly from the general theory developed in Section 4,
in particular Theorem 4.3 and Proposition 6.1. Moreover, we also have uniqueness of such a solution.
Indeed, if there were another quadruple (a˜(1), a˜(2), b˜(1), b˜(2)) solving (6.17)–(6.20) and satisfying (6.21)–
(6.22), by a standard verification argument one could prove that the bounded variation control that keeps
the process (Xt, Yt) in the region {(x, i) ∈ O : a˜(i) ≤ x ≤ b˜(i)} for almost every t ≥ 0 (i.e. solving
SP(a˜, b˜;x, i)) is optimal. However, this would contradict the uniqueness of the optimal control proved in
Theorem 3.4.
Remark 6.2. Here we comment on the structure of the value function in the general case of N ≥ 2
regimes.
In the above case study with N = 2 regimes, there are 4 boundaries a(i), b(i), i = 1, 2, solving uniquely
the system of 4 algebraic equations with constraints in (6.17)–(6.22), and the value function involves in
total 8 boundary-dependent-coefficients given by (6.14)–(6.16).
When solving the problem with N regimes, the expression of the value function in each of the subintervals
of the i-section of the continuation region Ci = {x ≥ 0 : a(i) < x < b(i)}, for any i ∈ M, will again
have two components. The first component is the particular solution to the coupled system of N ordinary
differential equations (cf. (6.1)), and it will always be a linear function with coefficients depending only
on the parameters of the problem. The second component is the general solution to the coupled system of
N ordinary differential equations, and it will be a polynomial with coefficients (in total the value function
will involve 2N2 such coefficients) depending on the 2N boundaries (in total) of the continuation region.
The latter boundaries will uniquely solve a system of 2N algebraic equations with constraints.
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It is then clear that for large N the complexity of the problem makes its analysis a daunting task.
However, by tackling the considered problem with our direct probabilistic approach, allows one to obtain
important information about the structure and the regularity of the value function, as well as the geometry
of the state space. Therefore, what remains to be done is just to , ind the numerical solution to the system
of 2N algebraic equations discussed above.
6.2.2. Comparative Statics Analysis. In this subsection we show how the optimal control boundaries a(1),
a(2), b(1), b(2), which define the government’s debt ratio management policy, depend on the relevant
model’s parameters, and we provide interpretations of the results. In what follows, whenever we need to
stress the dependence of the boundaries and value function on a given parameter χ, we will write a(i;χ)
and b(i;χ), as well as v(x, i;χ), x ≥ 0 and i = 1, 2.
Our analysis begins with a theoretical proof of the monotonicity of the control boundaries with respect
to r − g, and a numerical illustration in Figure 1. We then continue with a numerical study of the
sensitivity with respect to σ and q2 − q1. Due to the complexity of our problem, proving analytically
the monotonicity of a(i) and b(i), i = 1, 2, with respect to σ and q2 − q1 is far from trivial. However,
the explicit nature of our results (cf. the system of equations (6.17)–(6.20)) allows for an easy numerical
implementation resulting in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
Comparative Statics with respect to r − g. We start with the following result.
Proposition 6.3. For any i ∈ {1, 2} we have that (r − g) 7→ a(i; r − g) and (r − g) 7→ b(i; r − g) are
decreasing.
Proof. Let i ∈ {1, 2} be given and fixed. Remember that from (4.7) we can write
a(i; r − g) = inf{x ≥ 0 : v(x, i; r − g) > c2},
b(i; r − g) = sup{x ≥ 0 : v(x, i; r − g) < c1}.
From (6.13) it is easily seen that (r − g) 7→ v(x, i; r − g) is increasing. Hence, (4.7) imply that (r − g) 7→
a(i; r − g) and (r − g) 7→ b(i; r − g) are decreasing, and the claim thus follows. 
Remark 6.4. It is worth noticing that the proof of the previous result does not use the fact that the
continuous-time Markov chain Y has only two states. Therefore, Proposition 6.3 does hold in the more
general setting of N ≥ 2.
It is clear from (2.1) that the higher the real interest rate on debt (net of the GDP growth rate), the
more the country’s debt ratio increases in expectations. In such a case, the result of Proposition 6.3
implies that the government should adopt a more restrictive policy for the management of public debt,
in order to dam the resulting expected costs. In other words, as r − g increases, the critical level, below
which the government aims at keeping the debt ratio, decreases, so that the government should (optimally)
intervene sooner to reduce the debt ratio, through austerity policies in the form of spending cuts. On
the other hand, the trigger level at which the government starts increasing the debt ratio decreases as
well, meaning that the government should be willing to postpone its public investment intervention which
increases the debt ratio. (see Figure 1).
We can also observe from Figure 1 that when the interest rate on debt r is sufficiently higher that the
GDP growth rate g, then the debt ratio ceiling values b(1) and b(2) seem to come closer, thus implying
that the debt reduction policy is not strongly affected by the state of the economy. Similarly, the trigger
values a(1) and a(2) seem to converge to each other when the GDP grows at a much higher rate than
the interest on debt. Hence under such a high GDP growth, the government can adopt, independently of
the economic regime, a similar policy for public investments, aiming at increasing the debt ratio. On the
contrary, the trigger levels a(1) and a(2) (resp. b(1) and b(2)) take significantly different values when g is
sufficiently lower than r (resp. r is sufficiently lower than g), so that in this case the debt policy seems to
strongly react to the state of the economy.
Furthermore, under the choice of parameters of Figure 1, the levels b(i), i = 1, 2, that trigger the debt
reduction policies are on average equal to 60%, a value in line with the Maastricht Treaty’s reference value
of 1992.
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Figure 1. Monotonicity of the control boundaries for i = 1, 2 with respect to r − g. For
this plot we have used the following parameters’ values: q1 = 0.02, q2 = 0.02, λ1 = 0.1,
λ2 = 0, σ = 0.15, ρ = 0.25, c1 = 2, c2 = 1.25.
Figure 2. Monotonicity of the continuation (no-action) region’s size b(i)− a(i), i = 1, 2,
with respect to σ. For this plot we have used the following parameters’ values: q1 = 0.02,
q2 = 0.02, r = 0.04, g = 0.015, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0, ρ = 0.25, c1 = 2, c2 = 1.25.
Comparative Statics with respect to σ. We now move on to the study of the sensitivity of the control
boundaries with respect to the debt ratio’s volatility σ. We can observe from Figure 2 that, in both
regimes i = 1 and i = 2, the amplitude of continuation region b(i) − a(i) increases with σ. This result
is well known in the literature on real options (see [13], among others). In our setting of the debt ratio
management, this means that the more volatile the debt ratio, the more cautious the government is, hence
the longer it should wait before intervening on the debt ratio.
Comparative Statics with respect to q2− q1. It is seen in Figure 3 that, in both regimes i = 1 and i = 2,
the amplitude of the continuation region b(i)− a(i) decreases when q2 − q1 increases. In particular, this
can be viewed in two ways: On one hand, when the economy is in the “bad” state i = 1, a decreasing rate
q1 of moving to the “good” regime i = 2, suggests that the government should become more proactive,
adopt a more restrictive policy and be willing to intervene more frequently on the debt ratio. This will
counterbalance the fact that it is expected to remain under the “bad” regime for a longer time. On the
other hand, when the economy is in the “good” state i = 2, an increasing rate q2 of moving to the “bad”
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Figure 3. Monotonicity of the continuation region’s size, under both regimes, with respect
to q2−q1. For this plot we have used the following parameters’ values: r = 0.04, g = 0.015,
λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0, σ = 0.15, ρ = 0.25, c1 = 2, c2 = 1.25.
regime i = 1, suggests that the government should again become more proactive by adopting a more
restrictive policy, so that it is more prepared to deal with the worse economic scenario.
6.3. Comparison with the no-regime-switching case. In this section, we first present the solution
to the no-regime-switching case, namely, the problem with only one regime N = 1. Then, we compare the
resulting optimal government policy with the regime switching optimal policy from Section 6.2.2 (where
N = 2) and we comment on the results.
Observe that, under no-regime-switching, the dynamics of the governmentally managed debt-to-GDP
ratio become one-dimensional and read as (compare with (2.3))
dX˜t =
(
r − g)X˜tdt+ σX˜tdWt + dξt − dηt, t > 0, X˜0 = x ∈ R+,
where we assume there is no additional macroeconomic risk process Y , in the form of a continuous-time
Markov chain, and the (constant) interest rate on debt is simply given by the parameter r. In this
case, the debt ratio management problem (2.5)–(2.7) becomes one-dimensional as well, i.e. V (x, i) ≡
V (x). Moreover, the boundaries involved in the two-sided Skorokhod reflection problem SP(a, b;x, i) ≡
SP(a, b;x), defining the optimal controls in (5.3) and consequently the optimal policy of the government,
are also constants denoted by a and b.
It follows from standard theory on singular stochastic control problems (see Chapter VIII in [15];
compare also with the related problem in [17], among others) that the value function V of (2.7) with
h(x) = x2/2 in (2.5), satisfies the following ordinary differential equation with boundary conditions:
1
2
σ2x2Vxx(x) + (r − g)xVx(x)− ρV (x) = −1
2
x2 for a < x < b,
Vx(a+) = c2 and Vx(b−) = c1,
Vxx(a+) = 0 and Vxx(b−) = 0.
Solving the above free-boundary problem, and imposing continuity of V at x = a and x = b, we get
that
V (x) =

V (a)− c2 (a− x) , if x ≤ a,
D1x
δ1 +D2x
δ2 + 1
2(ρ−2(r−g)−σ2)x
2 , if a < x < b,
V (b) + c1 (x− b) , if x ≥ b,
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with
Di ≡ Di(a, b) =
(
a− c2(ρ− 2(r − g)− σ2)
)(
b
a
)δ3−i − (b− c1(ρ− 2(r − g)− σ2))( ba)
(−1)i+1 δi (ρ− 2(r − g)− σ2) aδi−1
[(
b
a
)δ1 − ( ba)δ2] ,
where the constants δ2 < 0 < 1 < δ1 are given by
δ1,2 =
1
2
− r − g
σ2
±
√(
1
2
− r − g
σ2
)2
+
2ρ
σ2
.
and the optimal boundaries a ≤ c2(ρ− r + g) < c1(ρ− r + g) ≤ b are given by the unique solution to the
system of arithmetic equations
J1,2(a) = J1,1(b) and J2,2(a) = J2,1(b)
where
Ji,j(x) =
(δi − 2)x− cj(δi − 1)(ρ− 2(r − g)− σ2)
xδ3−i−1
.
In order to compare the governmental optimal policy when there is no regime switching with the case
study with N = 2 regimes, we numerically calculate the values of the boundaries a and b and compare
with the values of a(1), a(2), b(1) and b(2). Recall that, the no-regime-switching case assumes a constant
interest rate r. Thus, in order to facilitate the comparison, we assume that under the “good” economic
regime i = 2 in the two-regime case, we set λ2 = 0, so that it also corresponds to an interest rate on debt
equal to r. Then, under the “bad” economic regime i = 1, the interest rate on debt becomes r + λ1 > r;
see Table 1.
If there is a possibility for the government to experience different economic regimes, it is seen from
Table 1 that the government should become more proactive, by adopting a more restrictive debt reduction
policy. Even under the “good” economic regime i = 2, the government should (optimally) intervene sooner
through austerity policies to reduce the debt ratio (at 58.23%), as opposed to the consistently “good”
economy under no regime switching, where the government is willing to intervene at a later stage (at
60.34%). This occurs irrespective of the fact that all parameters take exactly the same values. Clearly,
the possibility of a future turn of events, leading to worse macroeconomic conditions, is what makes the
government more cautious about the future and willing to intervene more frequently so that it is more
prepared to deal with the worse economic scenario if and when it comes. This also results in the slight
postponing of public investments under the possibility of such change from i = 2 to the worse economic
regime i = 1 (at a safer level 24.76%) compared to the slightly higher trigger level, when the economy is
consistently at a “good” state (at 24.85%).
Number of
Regime
Optimal boundaries (in %)
Regimes a b
N = 2
i = 1 22.5871 56.3248
i = 2 24.7630 58.2346
N = 1 24.8539 60.3393
Table 1. For this table we used the following parameter values: r = 0.012, g = 0.015,
σ = 0.15, ρ = 0.25, c1 = 2, c2 = 1.25; and, for the N = 2 case, the additional parameter’s
values: λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0, q1 = 0.02, q2 = 0.02.
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